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Considering Household Size in Contingent Valuation 
Studies 
Michael Ahlheim*)   and   Friedrich Schneider**) 
 
Abstract:  
In many empirical Contingent Valuation studies one finds that household size, i. e. the number auf household 
members, is negatively correlated with stated household willingness to pay for the realization of environmental 
projects. This observation is rather puzzling because in larger households more people can benefit from an 
environmental improvement than in small households. Therefore, the overall benefit should be greater for larger 
households. A plausible explanation could be that household budgets are tighter for large families than for smaller 
families with the same overall family income. The fact that larger families can afford only smaller willingness to 
pay statements in Contingent Valuation surveys than smaller families with the same income and the same 
preferences might have consequences for the allocation of public funds whenever the realization of an 
environmental project is made dependent on the outcome of a Contingent Valuation study. In this paper we show 
how the use of household equivalence scales for the assessment of environmental projects with the Contingent 
Valuation Method can serve to reduce the discrimination of members of large families.  
JEL-Class.: D61, H43, Q51 
 
1. Introduction 
The Contingent Valuation method (CVM) is one of the most popular methods for the 
economic appraisal of environmental projects. It aims at the assessment of the change in 
social welfare generated by public projects in monetary terms in order to decide if a project is 
worthwhile from a social welfare point of view or not. If two or more alternative public projects 
are under discussion the CVM can help to decide which of these projects should be realized 
and which should be dropped.1 Since the benefits accruing from different public projects 
affect different groups of the population differently the outcome of a valuation study has not 
only consequences for the efficiency of public spending but also for the distribution of the 
ensuing benefits. This paper deals with the equity aspect of environmental valuation.  
The CVM is an interview-based direct valuation technique which aims at the assessment of 
people's Hicksian Compensating Variation (HCV) for a public project. The HCV is positive if 
an individual's utility increases as a consequence of the project in question, otherwise it is 
negative. For a utility increasing project it can be interpreted as a person's maximum 
                                                          
* Prof. Dr. Michael Ahlheim, Institute of Economics (520F), University of Hohenheim, 70593 Stuttgart, Phone: 
(+49) 711 459-23596, E-mail: ahlheim@uni-hohenheim.de  
**  Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, Department of Economics, University of Linz, Phone:+43-732-2468-8210, Email: 
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1  Of course, there are other uses of environmental valuation studies, e. g. the assessment of damages to nature 
after environmental accidents [cf. Carson / Hanemann (2005, p. 827 ff.)] or the appraisal of the non-market 
production of the agricultural sector as an assessment basis subsidies in the EU [cf. Ahlheim / Frör (2003)]. 
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willingness to pay (WTP) for the realization of this project. For a utility decreasing public 
project it can be interpreted as her willingness to accept compensation (WTA) for the utility 
loss she expects from the project. Much has been written about the theoretical deficiencies of 
the Contingent Valuation method [cf. e. g. Harrison (2007), Mathews et al. (2004), Carson / 
Hanemann (2005, p. 906 ff.), Bockstael / Freeman (2005), Diamond (1996a, b), Diamond / 
Hausman (1994) or Hausman (2012)]. But this has not impaired the dominant position of the 
CVM among environmental valuation techniques and it still holds that it "is hard to 
overestimate the central importance of contingent valuation to modern environmental 
economics" as Carson and Hanemann (2005, p. 826) put it, an opinion that is basically 
shared by Kling et al. (2012) and confirmed by Carson (2012).  
While the theoretical concept of individual welfare measurement aims at the assessment of 
changes in the wellbeing of single persons, practical CVM surveys deviate from this path of 
virtue in two decisive ways: (1) instead of assessing individual welfare changes in terms of 
people's willingness to pay (for HCV > 0) or willingness to accept compensation (for 
HCV < 0) for a public project, in practical surveys typically the WTP or WTA of whole 
households instead of the single household members is assessed and (2) the amounts of 
willingness to pay or willingness to accept stated by the different households are aggregated 
over all households. This contradicts the rules of ordinal utility theory where a utility function 
is defined only up to a continuous and monotonically increasing transformation, so that no 
intensities of utility or of utility changes can be assessed and, therefore, no aggregation of 
utility levels or utility changes is allowed.  
The household perspective adopted in practical CVM surveys raises two kinds of 
aggregation problems, an intra-household and a trans-household aggregation problem. The 
intra-household aggregation problem refers to the question of how the individual preference 
orderings and, accordingly, the WTPs of the different members of a household can be 
aggregated to obtain one common household preference ordering or one common 
household WTP. The trans-household aggregation problem, on the other hand, refers to the 
question of how the WTPs of different households should be aggregated to attain the overall 
"social WTP" for a public project or its social value. This trans-household aggregation 
problem is solved in most practical valuation studies simply by multiplying the mean WTP 
assessed from a representative household sample by the number of all households affected 
by the project in question. Ideally (i. e. if the selected household sample is really 
representative) this procedure is equivalent to adding up the HCVs over all households. As a 
decision criterion regarding the social desirability of a certain public project the Hicks (1939) - 
Kaldor (1939) criterion, which was originally defined for the sum of individual HCVs, is 
applied to the sum of household WTPs in practical cost-benefit analyses. In this context it 
postulates that a positive sum of household HCVs signals a potential Pareto improvement, 
so that the project in question can be recommended for realization. If the sum of all HCVs is 
negative the project should be rejected.2 This shows that practical cost-benefit analysis 
based on the Hicks-Kaldor criterion violates the rules of ordinal utility theory by aggregating 
utility on two levels: the level of the people living in the same household, and the level of 
different households which are all affected by the same public project.  
                                                          
2  Since not only the CVM but also most of the other environmental valuation methods use this kind of 
household-based aggregation the resulting plausibility problems are, of course, not confined to the CVM only. 
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Our main concern here is, of course, not the fact that practical project appraisal techniques 
like the CVM contradict the pure doctrine of neoclassical welfare theory but, instead, we are 
worried that these techniques when applied in practical valuation studies often lead to 
counterintuitive results. When projects causing environmental improvements are valued one 
would expect that the WTP for such projects increases with household size since in many-
person households more people will benefit from that project than in single-person 
households. Contrary to this hypothesis many empirical studies yield results where stated 
WTP decreases with household size [see e. g. Whitehead (1991), Whittington / Smith. 
(1992), McDaniels et al. (1992), Garrod and Willis (1994), Johannesson et al. (1996), 
Chambers et al. (1998), Roschewitz (1999), Hammit et al. (2001), Liu et al. (2003), Ahlheim 
et al. (2004), Dong et al. (2004), Aprahamian et al. (2007)]. Chambers et al. (1998, p.149) 
give the following explanation for their result of a negative influence of family size on WTP: 
"This result might be related to ability to pay; as family size increases, budgets tighten, and 
WTP falls". Our analysis here will be focussed on this aspect of trans-household aggregation 
since it has consequences for the distributional effects of public spending in the 
environmental sector.   
If aggregation of household preferences for a public project is done by simply adding up the 
WTPs and WTAs of all households affected by this project and if the stated WTP of the 
members of large families as compared to the members of small families with the same 
household income and the same preferences of household members has to be smaller 
because the same budget constraint is more restrictive for large households than for small 
households this procedure implies a discrimination against the members of large 
households. It means that their "vote" in terms of stated WTP has less weight in the 
aggregation procedure than the vote of smaller households, all other things being equal. The 
fact that households with equal preferences and equal household income are treated 
differently in such valuation studies violates the principle of horizontal equity according to 
which equals have to be treated equally [cf. e. g. Slemrod / Yitzhaki (2002, p. 445)]. In order 
to reduce this household-size bias of Contingent Valuation results we suggest considering 
household size explicitly in valuation studies by using household equivalence scales for the 
aggregation of household WTPs.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section we highlight the theoreti-
cal background of aggregation in environmental valuation analyses and show that WTP has 
to decrease with freely disposable income. This is the source of implausible results if 
household WTPs instead of individual WTPs are aggregated. In section 3 we discuss the 
theoretical concept of equivalence scales and their possible integration in environmental 
valuation studies. In section 4 we illustrate the practical application of equivalence scales 
empirically using a practical example of a Contingent Valuation study. Section 5 offers some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Project appraisal  
In this section we contrast the theoretical background of environmental valuation with the 
practice of project appraisal to show where the common aggregation procedure leads to a 
deviation from what theory demands.  
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2.1 Individual welfare measurement 
The assessment of individual welfare effects of an environmental project aims at the 
identification of the individual utility changes caused by this project  
(1) ∆ Uj   =   U
1
j  -  U
0
j  = uj (xj
1, z1)  -  uj (xj
0, z0)  
where the index j denotes individuals j ∈{1, 2, ..., J} and U 0j  and U
1
j  denote the utility levels 
attained by an individual j before (situation 0) and after (situation 1) the project has been 
accomplished. The function uj(⋅) is the individual's direct utility function, xj∈ℜ
N is the vector of 
market commodities consumed by individual j and z∈ℜM is a vector of parameters describing 
the state of the environment, e. g. water or air quality, the number of different species in a 
certain area, the number of services provided by a certain ecosystem etc.  
Since utility changes cannot be observed directly ∆Uj is typically measured by the Hicksian 
Compensating Variation (HCV). If we focus on the environmental effects of a public project 
and assume prices and income to be constant, the Hicksian Compensating Variation for an 
individual j can be described indirectly by the identity 
(2) vj ( p, z
1, I j - HCVj )   ≡   vj ( p, z
0, I j )  =   Uj
0  
where vj (⋅) is the j
th individual's indirect utility function. Alternatively the Hicksian 
Compensating Variation can be defined directly by the identity  
(3) HCVj (p, z
1, Uj
0, Uj
1)     ≡   ej (p, z
1, Uj
1)  -  ej (p, z
1, Uj
0)  
where ej (⋅) is the j
th individual's expenditure function. From the strict monotonicity of the 
expenditure function in utility U it follows that HCV is a reliable welfare indicator in the sense 
that it is positive for utility increases and negative for utility decreases. Within the world of 
ordinal utility the absolute value of the HCV is meaningless, it is only its sign that matters. In 
this pure interpretation an aggregation of the HCVs of different individuals does not make 
sense.  
 
2.2 Aggregation 
Nevertheless, in practical cost-benefit analyses the HCV is typically aggregated over all 
individuals affected by a project. For the political decision if this project should be carried out 
or not it is often not enough to assess the individual utility effects of that project according to 
(3), but it is also necessary or at least desired by politicians that these individual HCVs are 
aggregated. We know that an "objective", i. e. a non-normative aggregation of individual 
preferences is not possible under fairly plausible conditions. As a convention the Hicks-
Kaldor criterion, according to which a public project should be accepted as socially beneficial 
if the sum of the individual Hicksian Compensating Variations according to    
(4) ( )∑∑
==
−=
J
1j
0
j
1
j
1
j
1
j
J
1j
j )U,z,p(e)U,z,p(eHCV    
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is positive, is widely accepted in cost-benefit analysis. This kind of aggregation is compatible 
with the postulation of a utilitarian welfare function since for constant p and constant z the 
expenditure function is a (money-metric) utility function. 
Of course, (4) does not represent some objective form of utility aggregation but corresponds 
to a specific (and in a way arbitrary) distributional norm. In the cardinal world of utility 
aggregation according to (4) a positive HCV (WTP) of one individual can be 
overcompensated by the negative HCV (WTA) of another individual. Further, if it is to be 
decided which of two alternative projects in two different regions should be realized it might 
be decisive in which region people with higher incomes live because higher incomes lead to 
higher WTPs and, therewith, to a higher overall social benefit in this region according to the 
aggregation mode (4).  
The reason for this (mostly unwanted) distributional effect of government spending is that the 
HCV increases with income. This can be seen if we substitute the household's indirect utility 
function ( )jj I,z,pv  for the utility levels Uj in (3) so that we obtain the "indirect" version of 
the Hicksian CV as a function of p, z and I according to 
(5) ( )( ) ( )( )j0j1jj1j1jj10indirj I,z,pv,z,peI,z,pv,z,pe)I,z,z,p(HCV −≡  . 
Taking into account the duality identity ( )( ) jjjj II,z,pv,z,pe ≡  we obtain the first-order 
derivative of (5) with respect to income as  
(6) 
( ) ( )
j
j
0
j
j
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j
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j
j
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j
indir
j
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I
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∂
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⋅
∂
∂
−≡
∂
∂
  . 
From ( )( ) jjjj II,z,pv,z,pe ≡  it follows that the derivative of the expenditure function with 
respect to utility at some point [p, z, v(p, z, I)] is reciprocal to the derivative of the indirect 
utility function w. r. t. income, so that (6) can be expressed as  
(7) 
( )
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∂
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−≡
∂
∂
 >  0  . 
Since the expenditure function is strictly monotonically decreasing in environmental quality, 
for an environmental improvement it holds that under the assumption of a decreasing 
marginal utility of income its reciprocal, i. e. the "marginal cost of utility" jj U/e ∂∂ , must be 
greater for ( )0j0j U,z,pe  than for ( )0j1j U,z,pe . From (7) it follows then that under the 
conventional assumption of a decreasing marginal utility of income the Hicksian 
Compensating Variation increases with disposable income.  
In an ordinal world where only the sign and not the absolute value of the HCV is considered 
this relation between HCV and income does not matter, but as soon as we start to aggregate 
the individual HCVs according to (4), the interests of persons with higher disposable incomes 
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are more effectively represented in cost-benefit analyses than the interests of individuals with 
low incomes and the same preference ordering.   
2.3 Project appraisal on a household basis 
The Contingent Valuation method is an interview-based valuation technique. In the centre of 
a CVM interview is the elicitation question where respondents' WTP for the project is 
assessed. In a typical CVM survey a representative random sample of all households 
potentially affected by a public project is drawn for the interviews. Then a randomly chosen 
member of each of the selected households is interviewed and she or he is asked (among 
other things) the whole household's WTP for the project in question. This implies that the 
final decision if a certain environmental project should be implemented or not, is made after a 
two-stage aggregation process. On the first stage the individual preferences of the members 
of a single household are aggregated (at least implicitly) by the household member who is 
asked the household's WTP in a CVM interview, and then on the second stage the WTPs of 
all households are aggregated by the researchers in order to obtain a social WTP for the 
public project in question.  
This procedure leads to two different aggregation problems arising in the context of a 
Contingent Valuation study. One problem is the problem of intra-household utility 
aggregation mentioned above. This refers to the question of how the preferences of different 
household members should be aggregated so that a single WTP for a public project can be 
elicited. Munro (2009, p. 5) or Lindhjem and Navrud (2009, p. 11) find that most papers 
reporting the results of empirical CVM studies are rather hazy regarding the kind of elicitation 
question that should be asked: should respondents answer the WTP question as individuals 
or as households? In most studies, however, it is at least implicitly assumed that the 
randomly chosen household member who is interviewed should state the WTP of the whole 
household for the environmental project in question. The theoretical fundament of this 
practice is the unitary household model according to which a household can be treated as if 
there were a single agent in each household maximizing a single (unitary) household utility 
function. This model presupposes income pooling which implies that for a household's 
consumption decisions only the amount of aggregate household income matters while the 
source of income is irrelevant for the household decisions. In this case it does not matter 
which household member is interviewed in a CVM survey because the stated WTP for a 
public project will always be the same. Ion Strand (2007) shows in a theoretical household 
bargaining model that the WTP for a public good stated by an arbitrary household member 
on behalf of the whole household is the same as the sum of the individual WTPs of all 
household members if the marginal valuation of that public good is the same for all 
household members. Ebert and Moyes (2009) analyse household decision making also on 
the basis of a game-theoretical household model and show that the outcome of an intra-
household decision process depends decisively on the degree of cooperation between the 
different household members.  
Empirical evidence does not support the unitary household model. Empirical studies show 
that in practice individual consumption or valuation decisions made separately by household 
members on behalf of the whole household depend on the person who makes the decision. 
Bateman and Munro (2005) find in an experimental study with couples that risky choices for 
the couple have different outcomes depending on who makes the choice: the husband, the 
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wife or both together. This result is confirmed by another empirical study by Bateman and 
Munro (2009) where they find in a series of choice experiments that the health risks accruing 
from pesticides and fat in food are valued differently depending on which household member 
is asked. In a split-sample CVM study Lindhjelm and Navrud (2009) ask individual household 
members their valuation of a biodiversity preservation project in Norway from their own 
individual perspective and from the household perspective. They find that individual valuation 
is not much different from household valuation if the respective answers are compared 
between the two samples. But they also find that in the same sample stated household WTP 
is much higher than individual WTP if respondents are first asked their individual WTP and 
then their WTP on behalf of the whole household.  
These empirical results show that the common practice of aggregating household WTPs 
instead of individual WTPs leads to biased results and needs some additional 
considerations: firstly, we cannot be sure that respondents in CVM interviews aggregate the 
preferences of the different household members correctly and, secondly, even if the 
respondent aggregates the WTP of the individual household members correctly, their WTP is 
restricted by the common household budget constraint that is the tighter the more people live 
in the household, other things being equal.  
 
2.4 Distributional consequences 
In practical cost-benefit analyses in the environmental sector only the benefits accruing from 
a public project are assessed in household interviews since households typically benefit from 
environmental projects, while they do not see the project costs. Therefore project costs, 
which are typically based on market prices (like the cost of capital, materials and labour), are 
assessed separately from the benefits which are measured in terms of households' 
willingness to pay for the realization of such a project.  
Practical project assessment studies, therefore, follow the decision rule that a public project 
should be realized if the benefits as measured by the sum of the affected households' 
willingness to pay for the project WTPh exceed the project costs C: 
(8)    tionimplementaforproject
reject0
rejectoraccepteither0
accept0
CWTP
H
1h
h










⇒<
⇒=
⇒>








−∑
=
 
where h is the index denoting households h = 1, 2, …, H. As mentioned before empirical 
studies like e. g. Whitehead (1991), Whittington / Smith (1992), McDaniels et al. (1992), 
Garrod and Willis (1994), Johannesson et al. (1996), Chambers et al. (1998), Roschewitz 
(1999), Hammit et al. (2001), Liu et al. (2003), Ahlheim et al. (2004), Dong et al. (2004), 
Aprahamian et al. (2007) show that in practice stated household WTPh is often negatively 
correlated with household size. This implies that the chances for the realization of a project 
are the worse the more large-size households are among the supporters of the project. If the 
decision is between two alternative projects the project with a higher number of small-size 
households (other things being equal) stands a better chance of being selected for 
implementation even if a smaller number of people might be concerned by this project. 
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Therefore, with the implementation rule (8) which is typically used in environmental valuation 
studies large households have more problems to get projects realized that are in their 
interest than small-size households with the same income and preferences.  
Since one cannot reasonably expect that the aggregate appreciation of an environmental 
project is lower in many-person households than in households with less members the only 
plausible explanation for this negative correlation is that household WTP of large-size 
households is more restricted by the household budget than the WTP of small-size 
households other things being equal. This would not pose a problem from a theoretical as 
well as a political point of view if everybody could freely choose in which kind of household 
he wants to live and if he could correct this choice at any time. Then the choice of the 
household a person lives in (and its size) could be regarded as reflecting her preferences like 
any other consumption decision does. In reality this is typically not the case, not for the 
children and often also not for the adults. Therefore, family size for many people is a kind of 
"fate" and this fate decides on the effectiveness with which people's preferences for some 
public good are represented and considered in a household-based valuation study.  
The question whether this constitutes a problem or not, is a political as well as an ethical 
question. Environmental valuation studies provide the scientific basis for political decisions 
regarding the allocation of public funds. Since these allocation decisions are also decisions 
with respect to the distribution of the benefits accruing from these public funds questions of 
equity and distributional justice cannot be neglected here. For consistency as well as 
distributional reasons we suggest including household equity considerations explicitly in 
decisions on the realization of public projects, especially in the environmental sector. Since 
environmental decisions are oriented towards the future and the wellbeing of future 
generations, especially in this context a discrimination of families with many children seems 
to be rather unfortunate. Therefore we suggest using a weighted sum of household WTPs 
instead of (8) for the cost-benefit comparison, where household equivalence scales serve as 
welfare weights. Such a weighted aggregation of household WTP would lead to a more equal 
treatment of different households with different household size.  
 
3. Enhancing the validity of CVM studies by using equivalence scales  
Equivalence scales are well-known from the literature on poverty lines and the assessment 
of welfare payments [cf. e.g. Takeda (2010), Dagum / Ferrari (2004), Browning (1992)]. 
Equivalence scales are also considered in the context of taxation because they are regarded 
suitable to meet the requirements of horizontal equity there [cf. e. g. Lambert (2004)]. 
Horizontal equity in taxation refers to "…the idea that equals should be treated equally by the 
tax system, or that tax liability should not depend on any of a set of irrelevant characteristics" 
[Slemrod / Yitzhaki (2002, p. 445)]. Lambert (2004, p. 76) states: "It has become 
conventional to apply an equivalence scale to determine the equals at the family level". This 
is exactly what is needed for an adequate aggregation of household WTPs: identifying 
"equals" and giving them equal opportunities to feed their preferences for a public project into 
the decision rule (8). "Irrelevant characteristics" [Slemrod / Yitzhaki (2002, p. 445)] like the 
size of the family they happen to be born into should not be an obstacle to their influence on 
that decision. Equity in the context of environmental valuation, therefore, refers to people's 
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influence on the decision if a specific environmental project should be realized or not, or 
which of several alternative projects should be carried out. Our suggestion is to give 
households with equal preferences and equal household income but different size the 
opportunity to state equal WTPs for a specific environmental project. For this purpose the 
households' stated WTPs should be weighted by suitable equivalence scales in order to 
make their stated WTPs compatible with each other. This aggregation procedure would lead 
to a modified decision rule 
(9)         





⇒<
⇒=
⇒>








−⋅∑
= reject0
rejectoraccepteither0
accept0
CWTPS
H
1h
hh  
where Sh is the equivalence scale of a household h.  
Studies on the different "welfare potential" of the same income for different households with 
different socioeconomic characteristics have a long tradition going back as far as the end of 
the nineteenth century to the work of Engel (1883 and 1895) whose equivalence scale 
concept serves as a reference for more modern concepts even today. Engel used the food-
expenditure shares of different household groups as welfare weights in order to make 
households of different size and composition comparable with each other. While Engel's 
equivalence scales follow mere statistical concept later approaches to the equivalence scale 
problem were more sophisticated and typically based on neoclassical household theory. 
Especially, the papers of Prais and Houthakker (1955), Barten (1964), Kapteyn and van 
Praag (1976), Lewbel (1989), Blundell and Lewbel (1991), Muellbauer (1974, 1977, 1980) 
set further landmarks in this field of research. Here the question what incomes would be 
needed to achieve a certain level of household utility with different household sizes and 
compositions stands in the center of interest. Several concepts of equivalence scales have 
emerged over the years [for an overview see e. g. Dagum / Ferrari (2004)]. The extensive 
literature on the empirical measurement of equivalence scales covers a variety of 
approaches (cf. Ray 1986). Well-known concepts stem from, among others, van Praag (1968 
and 1991), Kapteyn (1994) or Steward (2009). For equivalence scales based on Russian 
data see Takeda (2010), for Dutch data see Melenberg / van Soest (1995) and for an 
application to German data Charlier (2002).  
The general idea which is common to the various concepts of household equivalence scales 
is that the material needs of a household depend, among other things, on its demographic 
characteristics, especially on its size and composition. Households with different demo-
graphic characteristics need different amounts of income to attain a given utility level or 
standard of living, even if preferences are equal. Analogously, the same income generates 
different degrees of satisfaction for households with different demographic characteristics 
and equal preferences. A household equivalence scale is "... a budget deflator which reflects 
household needs", as Muellbauer (1980, p. 154) puts it. Or, more precisely: "Equivalence 
scales are to welfare comparisons across households with different characteristics what cost 
of living indices are to welfare comparisons for a given household facing different prices" 
(Muellbauer, 1980, p. 155).  
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In analogy to the individual expenditure function used in (3) we may define a household 
conditional expenditure function [see e. g. Pollak / Wales (1979), p. 217] as  
(10) e (p, z, W, δ)    ≡    min p⋅x    ,    s. t.  w (x, z, δ)  ≥  W 
where W is the household utility level defined by the (unitary) household utility function 
W = w(x, z, δ) ( )( )δ≡ ,)z,x(u...,,)z,x(u,)z,x(uw~ FF2211  with x = ∑
=
F
1f
fx . The number 
of family members is F and δ is a vector of demographic household parameters like the 
number of adults, number of children etc. Since this unitary kind of household model is 
assumed in most practical valuation studies at least implicitly and since we do not want to 
interfere with the discussion on intra-household aggregation in this paper we will build our 
further argumentation here on this model.  
From (10) we can derive the definition of conditional equivalence scales.3 A standard or 
reference household with two adults and no kids is defined and all other households are 
regarded in relation to this reference household. Then an equivalence scale Sh for a 
demographic household group h expresses the ratio between the minimum expenditure a 
household from this group has to make in order to realize a certain level of satisfaction on the 
one hand and the respective expenditures of the reference household on the other [cf. also 
Deaton / Muellbauer (1980, p. 205) or Takeda (2010, p. 352)):    
(11) Sh   =   S(p, z, W, δ
h, δr)   ≡   
),W,z,p(e
),W,z,p(e
r
h
δ
δ               { }( )H...,,2,1h ∈  
where the functional forms of the expenditure functions for household h and for the reference 
household r are the same since, typically, all households are assumed to have the same 
preference ordering 4 and differ only in the demographic parameters δ. Obviously, for the 
reference household r it holds that Sr = S (p, z, W, δ
r, δr) ≡ 1.  
Since the household utility level W cannot be assessed directly it is typically expressed by 
the indirect household utility function v(p,z,I) so that the equivalence scale Sh becomes  
(12) Sh  =  ( )rh,,I,z,pSˆ δδ   ≡  ( )( )rh,,I,z,pv,z,pS δδ       ,   { }( )H...,,2,1h ∈  
The dependence of the equivalence scale on prices and income is usually interpreted as a 
dependence on real income pˆ/IIˆ =  where pˆ  is some cost-of–living index.  
Assuming that the WTP stated by the reference household r is a reliable indicator for its utility 
gain resulting from an environmental project (i. e. neglecting the intra-household aggregation 
problem here) we suggest correcting the WTP stated by other households with different 
                                                          
3  As mentioned before there are many different definitions and concepts of equivalence scales in the literature.  
For an overview see e. g. Dagum / Ferrari (2004). 
4  The implications of the assumption of identical preferences across all households have been extensively 
analyzed by Fisher (1987). 
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household sizes using an appropriate equivalence scale Sh in order to assess their "true" 
benefits Bh received from the project in question:    
(13) Bh   =   Sh ⋅ WTPh             { }( )H...,,2,1h ∈   
This up- or down-scaling of the WTP stated by a household h corresponds with endowing 
this household with a virtual income that would enable this household to state the same WTP 
as the reference household r [cf. Ahlheim (1998)]. Correcting stated WTP through 
equivalence scales which leads to scale-corrected household benefits Bh is a pragmatic way 
of avoiding the problems associated with the empirical assessment of virtual incomes.  
The revised social value of some environmental project as needed in (9) would then be 
 (14) Bsocial  =  ∑∑
==
⋅=
H
1h
hh
H
1h
h WTPSB  
instead of the unweighted sum of household WTPs according to (8). In practice, however, 
not every household potentially affected by a public project can be interviewed. As explained 
before, typically a representative random sample of households is chosen for the CVM 
interviews and the mean household WTP calculated from this sample is then extrapolated to 
the set of all households concerned [for the problems arising from this aggregation procedure 
see e. g. Bateman and Munro (2005, 2009)]. The weighted aggregation mode (14) has, 
therefore, to be applied to the different socio-demographic groups contained in the chosen 
household sample.  
Since the questionnaire of a CVM survey typically contains questions with respect to the 
demographic characteristics of the households, it can be seen how many one-person, two-
person, three-person etc. households are in a household sample. If we define K different 
demographic groups k (k = 1, 2, ..., K) in a sample of H households we can assign suitable 
equivalence scales Sk to each household group k, so that all households in a group k obtain 
the same equivalence scale Sk. If the number of households in a demographic group k is Nk, 
the mean WTP of this group is denoted by kWTP  and the number of all households 
potentially affected by a project is H we can calculate the "sample"-version of the social 
benefits accruing from this project as  
(15) socialsampleB  =  ∑
=
⋅⋅⋅
K
1k
kkk NSWTPH
H
   . 
This aggregation procedure means a break with the simplifying "a dollar is a dollar"-principle 
prevailing in traditional cost-benefit analysis and a step towards a more sophisticated 
valuation of environmental changes where the different demographic characteristics of 
households are considered explicitly and the discrimination of the members of large 
households is reduced. Scale correction of household WTP in environmental valuation does 
not mean the solution to all our problems, but it constitutes an important step in the right 
direction.  
Correcting household WTP for household size directly by multiplying stated WTP by a 
suitable equivalence scale is, of course, only one possibility to deal with the problem of 
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different household sizes. Another possibility would be to first correct household income 
using equivalence scales and then feed this corrected virtual income into the equation for the 
estimation of WTP as a function of various household data one of which being income.5  
One problem when applying the equivalence scale approach in practice is the choice of the 
equivalence scale to be used in a concrete CVM study. Obviously, there is no unique 
"scientifically correct" way of computing equivalence scales Sk. Since aggregation of 
individual preference orderings is not possible on an objective, purely scientific basis all kinds 
of aggregation are normative and somehow arbitrary in the end. Ideally, an equivalence 
scale would take on the general form (11) but we know that it is difficult to assess empirically 
the values of the expenditure function needed for the computation of Sk according to (11). 
The main problem here is to assess a value for the household utility level W in (11). One 
class of studies relies on self-reported utility or wellbeing which is then used to estimate the 
equivalence scales econometrically based on household data (see e. g. Steward (2009), 
Takeda (2010) or Balli and Tiezzi (2010)). There are other, more pragmatic versions of 
equivalence scales proposed in the literature, some of which will be discussed in the next 
section. It is also clear that the absolute value of equivalence scales depends among other 
things on the choice of the reference household. For most equivalence scales a two-adult 
household is chosen as a reference household for which the respective equivalence scale is 
set equal to 1. Nevertheless, other choices might appear plausible as well.  
 
4. The Effect of the use of equivalence scales on CVM results  
In this section we demonstrate the effect of household equivalence scales on the results of 
practical CVM surveys in an empirical example (for details of the underlying valuation project 
cf. Ahlheim et al. (2004)).6 We apply this scale correction procedure to stated household 
WTP in a contingent valuation study carried out in Eastern Germany (cf. Ahlheim et al. 
(2004)) and show how the results of the study respond to the use of different forms of 
equivalence scales. The aim of the study was to assess the social benefits accruing from the 
reclamation of a former open-pit mining area close to the city of Cottbus, which lies 120 
kilometers south-east of Berlin. In this lignite pit near Cottbus mining activities will end by the 
year 2015. At this time the mining company will stop pumping off the groundwater so that it 
will rise to its original level and the former pit will be turned into a lake with a recreation area 
around it and also a small nature reserve.   
For the assessment of the benefits accruing from this reclamation project a contingent valua-
tion study was carried out in 2003. In this study more than 1,000 households were 
interviewed. Their willingness to pay for the realization of this rehabilitation project was 
                                                          
5  This approach was followed by Carlsson et al. (2004, p. 156) 
6  This numerical example is taken from an unpublished discussion paper (Ahlheim / Lehr 2008). We are grateful 
to Ulrike Lehr who made the calculations cited in this section. 
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elicited using the double-bounded dichotomous choice question format.7 The results are 
shown in Table 1. Based on a logit model, the average household willingness to pay for the 
Cottbus Lake turned out to be 4.39 Euro per month (with a 95% confidence interval between 
3.45 and 5.23 Euro per month).  
The city of Cottbus and the surrounding communities have roughly 100,000 people that live 
in 50,899 households. This yields an aggregate willingness to pay for the population affected 
by the rehabilitation project of ca. 223,000 Euro per month or 2.68 mill. Euro per year as 
shown in table 1.  
 
Table 1:  Average household WTP and aggregate WTP for the “Cottbus Lake” 
 Logit Model 
Avg. household WTP 4.39 Euro / month 
Aggregate WTP 2.68 mill. Euro / year 
Source: Ahlheim/Lehr (2008). 
 
Table 2 shows the sign of the coefficients for some potential determinants of willingness to 
pay with household size being one of them (for the details of the underlying Contingent 
Valuation study s. Ahlheim et al. (2004)). While the education level and household income 
have a positive effect on stated willingness to pay, age and the distance from people's 
homes to the lake have a negative effect. As expected from our earlier discussion, household 
size has a negative effect on willingness to pay. Most of these effects are plausible, only the 
fact that household size should have a negative effect on households' willingness to pay for 
the proposed rehabilitation project does not make sense. In larger households typically more 
children are living than in smaller households, and it is especially the younger people who 
will be able to enjoy the benefits accruing from the new lake, since these benefits will be 
available only in the far future (as viewed from 2003 when the survey was conducted). 
Therefore large households should have a higher household willingness to pay for the 
rehabilitation project than small household because more household members will receive 
benefits from the project and part of them will also enjoy these benefits longer than the 
members of small households since they are children now and will live longer after the 
rehabilitation process will have been accomplished and the lake will be ready for utilization.  
 
                                                          
7  This rise in the cost of living was explained to the respondents as a consequence of the fact that the project 
would have to be financed by the communities in this area who in turn will raise their communal taxes, fees 
etc. These increases in costs will be passed on by shop owners or house owners to their customers or tenants 
giving rise to a general increase in prices and the cost of living in this area. 
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Table 2:  The effects of some determinants on willingness to pay 
 sign p-value 
Age - 0.028 
Monthly income + 0.000 
Education level + 0.195 
Household size - 0.025 
Distance to the lake (in travel time classes) - 0.006 
Gender (1=female, 0=male) + 0.041 
Constant + 0.029 
Bid - 0.000 
Source: Ahlheim/Lehr (2008). 
 
In this basic version of the model the aggregate willingness to pay for the realization of the 
proposed reclamation project was calculated without consideration of household size or 
household composition. In a next step we shall analyze the effect of an explicit consideration 
of different versions of household equivalence scales on our results. The distribution of 
different family sizes in the research area is stated in table 3. It can be seen that in more than 
36% of all households in the Cottbus area more than two persons were living at the time 
when the survey was conducted.  
Table 3: Distribution of family size in Cottbus (2004, in percent) 
Number of household members 1 2 3 4 5 
 18.44% 46.25% 20.32% 12.33% 4.25% 
Source: Ahlheim/Lehr (2008). 
 
In our section 3 the concept of equivalence scales based on neoclassical household theory 
was discussed in detail. The empirical assessment of equivalence scales is still under debate 
among economists [cf. e.g. Schulte (2007), but also Steward (2009), Takeda (2010) or Balli 
and Tiezzi (2010)]. For practical applications the literature often suggests the use of expert 
scales or survey approaches [for the latter see Charlier (2002) or Schwarze (2003)]. Survey-
based approaches which rely on slef-reportetd household satisfaction levels were already 
popular in the 1970s with the so-called Leyden School (cf. Kapteyn / van Praag 1976) but are 
still under discussion today (see e. g. Steward (2009) or Takeda (2010)).  
Expert scales are the most widely used scales in practical applications, and the OECD 
scales are the most prominent examples (s. also Biewen (2000)). Table 4 gives an overview 
over the range of equivalence scales for Germany and compares them to the OECD scales. 
As can be seen from table 4 the amount of equivalence scales for a one-adult household is 
typically not just half the amount of the equivalence scales for a two-adult household but 
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higher. This reflects the fact that two adults living together can realize economies of scale 
regarding their cost of living, so that with the same household income they can realize a 
higher standard of living than a one-adult household with half that income.   
Table 4: Equivalence scales for Germany  
Number of household members 1 3 4 5 6 
Charlier 0.7 1.2 1.3 1.42 1.54 
Missong 0.6 1.28 1.43 1.54   
OECD (modif.) 0.67 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 
OECD (old) 0.59 1.29 1.59 1.88 2.18 
Praag 0.83 1.12 1.21 1.29 1.35 
Schröder 0.67 1.15 1.28 1.41   
Schwarze 0.79 1.15 1.26 1.37   
Social Assistance 0.56 1.36 1.72 2.08 2.44 
A childless couple is the reference household with an equivalence scale of 1.00. Source: Schulte 2007 
 
Table 4 does not account for the age of household members, especially of children, but we 
considered this in our calculations presented in table 5. In table 5 the equivalence scales 
from table 4 were used to correct the stated WTP of the different household groups for 
household size. It shows that the use of equivalence scales increased the total benefits from 
the reclamation project under consideration from 2.68 million Euro up to over 3 million Euro 
per year. This increase of the social value of the project by more than 300,000 Euro per year 
(or nearly 12%) as compared to the unscaled result is quite impressive. It gives us an 
indication of the considerable effect the use of equivalence scales could have on valuation 
studies carried out in developing countries where large families are far more common than in 
Germany.  
These results show that the use of equivalence scales changed the original non-scaled 
results substantially. This was to be expected since in our research site many households 
with children and tight budgets could be found, like also in the rest of Eastern Germany at 
that time. Therefore, the adjustment of WTP to household size as shown in table 5 lead to 
considerable changes in the total social value of the proposed reclamation project. One can 
also see from table 5 that the choice of the equivalence scale has a considerable influence 
on the survey results. Unfortunately, there are no clear-cut rules for a suitable choice of 
equivalence scales for such studies which would make things easier. Therefore, also the 
explicit consideration of household size and composition in CVM studies leaves us with a 
rest of uncertainty which kind of adjustment of our survey results would lead us to the 
"correct" results. This has to be considered especially when interpreting CVM results or 
explaining their importance to politicians or government officials.  
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Table 5: Mean willingness to pay adjusted with equivalence scales in € 
Scale WTP/ average household Total WTP 
Charlier 4.58 2,800,614 
Missong 4.61 2,816,776 
OECD (modif.) 4.64 2,835,498 
OECD (old) 4.80 2,934,793 
Praag 4.55 2,777,772 
Schröder 4.45 2,721,712 
Schwarze 4.53 2,771,584 
Social Assistance 4.94 3,020,152 
Source: Ahlheim/Lehr (2008).   
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Our main concern in this paper is the fact that in standard cost-benefit analyses based on 
Contingent Valuation surveys a systematic discrimination of households with many 
household members can be observed. The reason for this "household size bias" of CVM 
results is that the absolute value of the Hicksian Compensating Variation (which is equivalent 
to the willingness to pay for utility-enhancing public projects) decreases as the freely 
disposable income of a household decreases. Since the political decision if a certain project 
should be realized or not depends on the sum of the WTPs of all households affected by this 
project, the influence of many-person households on this decision is smaller than the 
influence of small households with the same gross income and the same household 
preferences, since a smaller part of their income is freely disposable and their budget 
constraint is more "biting". Especially in the context of environmental projects this is very 
unfortunate since large households are typically large because they have many children who 
might enjoy improved environmental quality in the future. Their preferences are not 
adequately considered in the decision rule used in conventional cost-benefit analyses. 
Therefore, we recommend using household equivalence scales as welfare weights in the 
Hicks-Kaldor criterion to adjust Contingent Valuation results to household size and to protect 
especially the interests of children in the political decision process based on environmental 
cost-benefit analyses. 
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